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INTRODUCTION 
This Court must act to correct a disastrous mistake in 
setting aside valid unanimous jury verdicts which defined the 
improper, fraudulent and conspiratorial acts of an attorney, 
based upon compelling and undisputed evidence presented at trial. 
While we appreciate its efforts to arrive at a reasonable opinion 
based upon Sua Sponte investigation, several findings of the 
court do not stand up to closer scrutiny and demand further 
review. To dispute the jury in the manner the court now 
contemplates would amount to a travesty of justice. We therefore 
ask the Court to invest a little more time and effort to get to 
the truth of the matter. 
Pro-Se Defendant/Appellees Del K. Bartel, Dale Thurgood and 
Lee Allen Bartel hereby submit their petition for rehearing of 
the appeal and cross appeal as designated above pursuant to Rule 
35 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendants state that this 
petition is presented in good faith and is not interposed for 
delay and rely upon the following facts and points of law that 
they assert the court must further consider; 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. This appeal/cross appeal stems from case No. C86-553 in 
the Third District Court wherein a unanimous jury rendered its 
decision on June 20, 1990, under a special verdicts form, that 
plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry were guilty of breach 
of contract, active interference, two separate counts of fraud 
and conspiracy to defraud as against defendants. 
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2. That plaintiffs received an award in this action in 
light of a directed verdict ordered by that court based upon a 
Masters Panel Report dated May 18, 1990 as created pursuant to a 
stipulated settlement agreement stemming from a bifurcated trial 
on plaintiffs masonry and related structural claims in February, 
1990. 
3. On or about July 1, 1994 the Supreme Court rendered its 
opinion wherein it basically denied the appeal and cross appeals 
of the parties with the exception of setting aside the directed 
verdict of the court and the jury's findings of fraud and 
conspiracy as against the DeBrys. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PREVAILING PARTY ISSUE 
IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
While this court declined to rule on the issue of prevailing 
party under the cross appeal, based upon the assertion that 
defendants do not claim they raised this issue below nor could 
the court find any indication that they did so, (opinion at 15) 
such is not the case. The prevailing party issue was raised as 
follows: 
1, Defendants specifically addressed the issue below under 
the Reply To Plaintiffs Motion To Clarify, Alter Or Amend 
Judgement And For Final Ruling Upon Defendants Post Trial Motions 
Point V, dated April 22,1991. (p 13149 - 13158, Exhibit A) 
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2. This matter was argued at hearing in the District Court 
on May 5, 1991. (Exhibit B. - transcript of hearing pages 2-14, 
46,47) 
3. Appellees notice of appeal dated June 18, 1991 included 
a copy of the judgment wherein this issue was referenced at 
paragraph 5. (Ref Appellate Court Record) 
4. Defendants docketing statement dated July 9, 1991 and 
amended docketing statement dated September 20, 1991 at paragraph 
3(e) cite the claim that the District Court erroneously refused 
to designate defendants as the prevailing party in this case. 
(Ref - Appel Ct. Record) 
5. Plaintiffs have failed to contest or dispute defendants 
prevailing party claims, as made under point V of appellees 
brief, nor did they contend this issue is presented for the first 
time on appeal because they were acutely aware of the fact that 
this issue was raised, argued and erroneously ruled upon below. 
The defendants are the prevailing party in this case and the 
jury verdict and applicable case law demands that ruling. 
POINT II 
KENNETH KARREN JR.'S TESTIMONY 
WAS CLEARLY INADMISSIBLE 
The matter involving Kenneth Karren Jr.'s testimony rendered 
on behalf of the DeBrys has been relegated to a vacuous footnote 
(No. 7 at p. 15) in the Court's opinion. The issue of "Bill 
Karrens"1 inadmissible testimony as submitted at trial must be 
reviewed for the following reasons: 
1. Defendants submitted argument under point III of 
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appellees brief at 37-40 and section III point X of appellees 
reply brief in support of their contentions. 
2. Specific citations to the trial transcript and exhibits 
submitted at trial factually prove that Karren Jr. falsely 
testified as a licensed contractor at trial, then falsely held 
himself out as the agent of a licensed contractor, subsequently 
submitting an invalid bid for repair of alleged defects at trial. 
(Ref tr. 815f 816f 825, 842-845, 900, 934-935, documents - app 
brief 1(1), 1(2), 2(21), 2(22)) 
3. Kenneth Karren Jr., as a Masters Panel member and 
judicial officer (See Plumb v. State 809 P. 2d at 734), appointed 
pursuant to Rule 53 Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, should have 
distanced himself from exparte actions such as preparing the bid 
for repairs as a licensed contractor for the DeBrys in the same 
action, (plaintiffs only submitted evidence under their 
theoretical costs of repair). Defendants further reference Rule 
605 Rules Of Evidence in this regard. 
4. These issues were raised under defendants motion and 
memorandum in the lower court on January 14, 1991. (Ref 12936 -
12986) Based upon the facts of the matter the court must find 
that Karren Jr.'s testimony was inadmissible and set aside any 
award stemming therefrom. 
POINT III 
SETTING ASIDE OP THE DIRECTED VERDICT 
ELIMINATES ANY DEBRY AWARD 
This opinion properly set aside the trial courts directed 
verdict but failed to fully apply that correct decision. The 
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court will note that the jury found that defendants were not 
negligent in the construction of the building. (Sp. ver. No. 1) 
Defendants did not breach the implied warranty of good 
workmanship (4b) the express warranty that the building would be 
free from defects (4c) the express warranty of occupancy (4d) the 
implied warranty of habitability (4e) and implied warranty of 
fitness for intended purpose (4f). 
Under the auspices of the erroneous directed verdict the 
jury was forced to find that defendants failed to construct the 
building according to the requirements of the Uniform Building 
Code. (4a, 16, 17, 18) Plaintiffs only awards, under the related 
breakdown of categories of repair include the following schedule; 
Masonry - $30,000, West stair - $675, Architectural - $7,000, 
miscellaneous - $10,000 (sp. ver. para. 18). The architectural 
award of $7,000 and miscellaneous award of $10,000 do not involve 
Uniform Building Code violations. Once the masonry and related 
structural claims have been removed pursuant to the February 1990 
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, no resultant damage claim 
remains. (Defendants would further assert that Architectural 
matters were addressed in that Settlement Agreement as well. See 
Appl. Brf. - 2(12)) 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT MUST ADDRESS THE MASTERS PANEL ISSUE 
Defendants dispute the Supreme Courts' failure to address 
issues directly involving the May 18, 1990 Masters Panel Report 
issued pursuant to Rule 53 Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure (App. 
5 
Brf. - Section II - 2(d)). With virtually no definitive Utah case 
law on the books in regard to Rule 53 and in light of the 
plaintiff/attorney's wrongful actions, it is incumbent upon the 
court to rule in regard to the DeBrys secret preparation of the 
Masters Panel Report as submitted at trial (App 2(13), 2(14)), 
DeBrys exparte communications with the panel (App 2(13), 2(14), 
the fact that one panel member testified he was prevented by the 
DeBrys from completing his work (App. 2(18), 2(20)), the fact 
that DeBry paid off the other two panel members himself (App. 
2(17)), the fact that the remaining two members under DeBrys 
direction later unilaterally provided a second report replacing 
the first report (App. 2(19)), the fact that the panel acted 
outside the scope of the reference (App. 2(12), 2(19)) and that a 
master (licensed engineer) offered his bid and testimony as a 
licensed contractor, as a paid witness, on behalf of the DeBrys 
at trial. This issue was presented to the trial court in post 
trial motions (R. 12939 - 12986) and on appeal (Appl Brf. Pt. 
Ill, Appl. Rep. Brf. at pt. X) and calls for the courts 
definative review. 
POINT V 
THE COURTS FINDINGS IN REGARD TO THE 
FRAUD, CONSPIRACY AND PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE AWARDS ARE MADE IN ERROR 
The defendants take issue with the courts opinion in regard 
to the fraud and conspiracy counts and the punitive damage award 
as rendered by the jury and as upheld by the court and emphasize 
the following points: 
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1. Initially, the issues pertaining to the fraud and 
conspiracy findings of the jury are not properly before this 
court. Plaintiffs failed to ever present any objection or 
argument in reference to these charges prior to trial, at trial 
or in post trial motions. Further, plaintiffs did not oppose 
these findings at trial when the verdicts were read and allowed 
the jury to be dismissed without objection. Plaintiffs 
misrepresented the facts when they declared that objections were 
rendered in this regard under post trial motions at R 11505-29 
and 11791-916. Careful review of those pleading reflects the 
facts that fraud and conspiracy issues were not mentioned as an 
issue contestedI (Exhibit C and D) Defendants previously 
referenced that fact (Appl rply brf - section I point 1) but this 
argument was apparently overlooked or ignored. Defendants further 
rely upon facts and case law cited under appellees' brief - Point 
II, Point III, Appl. reply brief - sections I - Point 4,5,8. 
2. Even if the court could somehow construe DeBrys' 
pleading as valid underlying objections to the fraud and 
conspiracy verdicts, under plaintiffs motions for a verdict and 
judgment n.o.v., (11505-11529 and 11791-11916) these matters are 
not properly before the court due to the acknowledged fact that 
the DeBrys failed to marshall the evidence as is required to even 
consider overturning these jury verdicts. 
3. Due to the fact that plaintiffs failed to properly 
marshall all the evidence concerning the fraud and conspiracy 
findings, and the fact that all the evidence was not before this 
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court, it must modify its evaluation of these jury verdicts as 
follows; 
A* The court mistakenly concludes that defendants failed 
to rely upon Debrys' misrepresentations to their detriment in 
charging the defendants with defective work that was done by 
someone else. That conclusion is in error. Based upon DeBrys' 
insistence that defendants subcontractors and or employees 
performed defective work on the building, defendants agreed to 
the scheduling and management order of the court (R. 4742-4746) 
voluntarily reentered the building in the fall of 1987, paid for 
new building permits, revised plans, new engineering 
specifications (in conjunction with Salt Lake County engineers 
and inspectors and DeBry engineers) to address every defect 
verified and found in the building. Defendants incurred 
$27,719.81 (Exhibit E) in direct costs in this performance, in 
reliance upon DeBrys false assertions that defendants employees 
and or subcontractors were responsible for a substantial number 
of defects in the building. (Tr. 1560-1563 and 790-796 Exhibit F) 
Defendants paid for the resolution of every defect found at that 
time, with the exception of two matters DeBrys refused to allow 
correction of - wire glass windows/parapet wall - or set back 
problems. (R 5070- 5073) 
These facts were presented at trial in 1990 (Tr. 770, 771, 
793-796, 1172-1176,1151-1153, 1081, 1560-163; trial Exhibits 
(247, AAA) The jury weighed this strong evidence in making its 
factual determinations and found that defendants relied upon 
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DeBrys' false representations concerning cited defects to 
defendants damage and detriment and this court cannot properly 
substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the finder 
of fact. Defendants further note that the trial courts' judgment, 
in absence of clear and specific facts supporting abuse of 
discretion, cannot be challenged. Barber v. Calder 522 P. 2d at 
700; Donohue v. Intermtn Health Care, Inc. 748 P. 2d 1067 (Utah 
1987) 
Defendants specifically reference Conder v. A. L. Williams & 
Associates, 739 p. 2d 634 (Utah App. 1987) in regard to the 
element of reliance wherein the court again found that reliance 
must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and 
it is usually a question for the jury to determine. See Berkeley 
Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 p. 2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980) 
Although it is impossible to draw precise legal boundaries of 
when reliance is reasonable the courts have given some direction. 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 p. 2d 134, 137 (1945) 
Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
assertions of fact without independent investigation. See Dugan 
v. Jones. 615 p. 2d 1237, 1247 (Utah 1980) Prosser & Keeton, The 
Law of Torts. 108, at 749-54 (5th Ed. 1984) 
It is apparent that DeBrys actions constitute innovative and 
unusual fraudulent conduct. In this instance plaintiffs take 
advantage of Robert J. DeBrys position in the community as an 
attorney and owner of a large law firm to use litigation and to 
some degree the court to perpetrate this fraudulent and 
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conspiratorial behavior. These actions are addressed in part as 
follows: 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multi-farious 
means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to 
in order to gain an advantage over another. In its general 
or generic sense, it comprises all acts, omissions, and 
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty 
and resulting in damage to another. 
37 C.J.S. Fraud s 1 
B. The court also misconstrues the jury's second fraud 
finding. While the court characterizes this verdict as concerning 
"payments due under the note" the jury verdict actually found 
that plaintiffs conspired to defraud defendants of payments due 
(sp. ver. 31) and that plaintiffs fraudulent action was a 
proximate cause of damage to the defendants, (sp. ver. 32) 
Evidence provided at trial addressed all nine (9) elements 
of fraud. (Ref Appl. Brf. Point V, Appl. Rply. Brf. - points 
XIII, IX) Evidence was presented showing that as part of the sale 
more than $152,858 of defendants proceeds were placed in escrow, 
pursuant to the closing documents. (Exhibit G) at the time of 
sale and after to facilitate the taking of these monies. Witness 
David Jorgensen admitted at trial wrongful actions performed in 
concert with plaintiffs involving the plan or scheme to take 
defendants escrowed funds (1364 -1365, 1401-1408, 1413-1414) 
including the fabrication and implementation of a false document 
designed to take defendant's escrow, expand the litigation and 
sue Utah Title and Abstract Company and later Fidelity National 
Title Co, (Tr. 1364-1365, 1401-1406) with the DeBrys ultimately 
filing suit against Jorgensen himself to shut him up. (Tr. 1404-
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1408, 1413-1414) Evidence was presented to show that DeBrys' 
actions, including the filing of false, misleading and contrived 
documents at closing and after to promote the issuance of the 
complaint (R. 4760-4899) in order to assert wrongful claims 
against monies due defendants, which defendants have not yet 
received due to DeBrys ongoing claims against escrow in the 
bankrupcy court. (Exhibit H) (This courts comment concerning the 
jury's finding that plaintiffs did not conspire to file a lawsuit 
before the closing (Sp. Ver. 33) is a distinct and separate claim 
irrelevant to the courts findings under special verdicts 31 and 
32.) 
C. The courts opinion concerning punitive damages also 
disregards the jury's finding of intentional active interference 
against the DeBrys (verdicts 26, 27 - sp ver. form, App 2(11)) 
which constitutes negligent action sounding in tort. The fact 
that the DeBry's were found to have knowingly and willfully 
proceeded to interfere further reflects blatant and 
unconscionable tortious conduct, in and of itself justifying the 
punitive damage award. This jury verdict is also not before the 
court, was not designated on appeal and precludes this court from 
setting aside the punitive damage award. 
The other test that is not addressed or demonstrated by 
plaintiffs is that reasonable persons could not have concluded as 
the jury in reaching its decision. DeBry v. Hilton Travel 
Services, Inc. v. Capital Intern. Airways. Inc.. 555p.2d 201 874 
(Utah 1976); Nuhn v. Broadbent. 507 p.2d 371 (Utah 1973) 
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POINT VI 
THE COURT'S OPINION CITES OTHER 
MATTERS THAT CALL FOR COMPLETION 
Due at least in part to the parties lack of guidance through 
more than 13,500 pages of the trial record, ten volumes of trial 
transcript and as a result of eight and one half years of 
protracted litigation, this court has drawn partial conclusions 
that call for completion. 
The Court recognizes DeBrys litigious actions (Opinion at 
p.3) but fails to acknowledge the full nature and extent of his 
wrongful conduct. The DeBrys intentional misrepresentations are 
confirmed, but all the facts governing the frauds are not fully 
analyzed. (Opinion at 6) The Court understands the DeBry attacked 
the jury verdicts without marshalling the but fails to apply this 
fact to each jury challenge. (Opinion p. 9 para. 1, Footnote 3 
p.9) The aforementioned facts and evidence as referenced under 
points I through V should assist this Court in bringing this 
matter to a proper conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, every appellate court in this country, and 
more particularly the Utah Supreme Court, is charged with the 
duty, where there has been a full trial of the issues, and the 
trial court has made findings and entered judgment thereon, to 
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may have 
been fairly drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
jury's findings, the judgment, and the contentions of the 
prevailing party. Where conflicts exist the court must consider 
12 
as true, the evidence that supports the verdict and the court 
will not substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of 
the jury. 
Review of the lower court record clearly reflects the fact 
that the issues involving prevailing party, the inadmissible 
testimony of Kenneth Karren Jr. and the invalid Masters Panel 
Report were submitted and ruled upon and are properly before this 
court. 
On the other hand issues involving fraud and conspiracy were 
never addressed below, and even if they had been plaintiffs 
failed to properly marshall all the evidence in order for the 
court to give those matters complete and thorough consideration. 
The tort of intentional active interference, an unchallenged 
finding against the DeBrys not before this court, in and of 
itself precludes the vacating of the punitive damage award. 
While the court did find that the courts directed verdict 
should be set aside it must carry that finding to its logical 
conclusion.... that DeBrys ultimately receive no award. 
We therefore ask this court to re-evaluate these narrow 
issues and modify its opinion in light of the appellate court 
rules that apply, the evidence submitted at trial, the applicable 
case law, the jury verdict, the judgment and the "actual facts" 
if the case as opposed to the distorted representations of the 
DeBrys and ultimately due to the fact that we were the prevailing 
party in this litigation. Any other prospect would serve to 
substantially deny defendant/appellees of their rights of due 
13 
Respectfully submitted this /J .—-day of July# 1994. 
DEL K. BARTEL 
DALE TH 
LEE A. BARTEL 
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Dale Thurgood and Lee Allan Bartel 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DeBRY and 
JOAN DeBRY, 
Plaintiffs , 
vs . 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. 
CASCADE DEFENDANTS' REPLY 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO CLARIFY, ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR FINAL 
RULING UPON DEFENDANTS' 
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Civil No. C86-553 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Defendants Del K. Bartel and Dale Thurgood, individually, 
and as to their respective partnership interest in Cascade 
Enterprises and Cascade Construction, and Lee Allan Bartel, 
individually, and as to his partnership interest in Cascade 
Construction, hereinafter referred to as "Cascade defendants", 
hereby offer the following response to plaintiff Robert J. 
DeBry's memorandum, proposed judgment and plaintiff's letters 
dated April 16, 1991: 
PERTINENT FACTS 
The following additional facts specifically controvert 
representations made by plaintiffs. 
1. Evidence produced at trial established the following: 
(a) There was no owner/contractor relationship between 
plaintiffs and Cascade defendants. 
(b) Tri-K Contractors was a licensed general contrac-
tor who entered into a direct contract with Cascade Enterprises. 
(T.T. - page 750, lines 10-25; page 751, lines 1-5; page 779, 
lines 11-24.) 
(c) The December 10, 1985, Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement prepared by plaintiffs for the aborted closing on that 
date was a void document replaced by the December 13, 1985, Final 
Settlement Agreement plaintiffs took benefit under on the 
December 13, 1985, closing and sale. (T.T. - pages 781-786.) 
(d) It was established at trial that plaintiffs were 
in default on the Trust Deed Note as of December 13, 1986, with 
interest accruing at 17% on the balance due and owing of 
$70,000.00 as of that date. (Ref. - Trust Deed Note.) 
2.- In regard to the bifurcated trial held on February 28, 
1990, the following facts were established: 
(a) The settlement agreement negotiated and agreed 
upon directly involved the DeBrys and defendants Sherwin Knudsen 
and Tri-K Contractors. (Ref. - Order at Trial.) 
(b) Only Tri-K Contractors and Sherwin Knudsen, as 
defendants, and the DeBrys, as plaintiffs, participated in the 
selection of the masters panel, the expenses of the panel, 
payment for necessary testing, supervision of repair work and the 
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actual cost of masonry repairs. (Ref. - Order at Trial.) 
(c) All matters regarding plaintiffs' claims in regard 
to the masonry were resolved by this settlement with the excep-
tion of the consequential damage claims pertaining thereto. 
(Ref. - Order at Trial.) 
3. Cascade defendants did not stipulate to accept any 
responsibility for any costs relating to inspection, testing, 
supervision or repair of masonry on the building. (Ref. - Order 
at Trial.) 
4. Cascade defendants did, in fact, object to the Masters1 
Panel Report at the main trial held on May 21, 1990, at the time 
the report was submitted at trial by the plaintiffs, during trial 
when Edward Wells, plaintiffs' co-counsel, repeatedly offered 
characterizations of the report, also in regard to plaintiffs' 
consequential damage claims, and in response to plaintiffs1 
motion for directed verdict under the Masters' Panel Report, 
prior to closing arguments. (T.T. - page 558, lines 7-11; pages 
1645-1647; pages 217-218.) 
5. Cascade defendants further objected to any damage award 
relating to the directed verdict and the Masters' Panel Report in 
post-trial motions, including their objection to the memorandum 
decision issued by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT FACTUAL 
OR RESPONSIVE TO THE ISSUES AT HAND. 
A review of plaintiff's memorandum reflects the fact that 
plaintiff is attempting to relitigate old issues previously 
-1-
settled. Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, the birfurcated 
trial involving masonry defects was reduced to settlement on 
February 28, 1990. On June 20, 1990, a unanimous jury rendered 
its decision regarding plaintiffs' breach, active interference, 
fraud and conspiracy to defraud, based upon the evidence pre-
sented at trial, including plaintiffs' void Escrow and Non-Merger 
Agreement and the Final Settlement Agreement which replaced it. 
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the jury found that Cascade's 
assertions in regard to the Trust Deed and Note were, in fact, 
true. Included in that decision was the finding that plaintiffs 
conspired to defraud defendants at the closing and sale of the 
building. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF MISCHARACTERIZES 
THE APRIL 5f 1991, CONFERENCE. 
Cascade defendants dispute the representations made by 
plaintiff in regard to the April 5, 1991, conference. The court 
did not find that there was no basis in fact or law for the 
imposition of treble damages against plaintiffs* alleged miscon-
duct at trial. The court actually stated that those specific 
issues would not be ruled upon by the court, but would have to be 
addressed another day, in another court, and in conjunction with 
that statement, the court also stated that damages under active 
interference should also be included in a new complaint if defen-
dants chose to proceed under that finding. The court further 
addressed the forwarding of contemptuous conduct charges against 
Robert J. DeBry and Edward T. Wells in this case to the presiding 
judge for disposition. 
-4-
which you have stipulated." (T.T. - page 1647, lines 18-19, 22-23.) 
The Court: "The motion for the parties to be bound by the 
masonry report is granted. The question before the jury now is 
whether or not consequential damages flowed from the alleged 
masonry defects." (T.T. - page 1648, lines 16-19.) 
Based upon these specific and clear facts there can be no 
question that the $30,000.00 in masonry repairs claimed by 
plaintiffs against Cascade are improper and must be disallowed. 
POINT V 
CASCADE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED 
TO COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
OF COURT. 
Cascade defendants contend that they are entitled to their 
costs in this matter pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, due to the fact that Cascade defendants were the 
prevailing party in this case and more specifically due to the 
fact that the parties voluntarily entered into the Trust Deed 
with Assignment of Rents #UT 105660, wherein plaintiffs specifi-
cally agreed to pay all costs associated with the enforcement of 
that document. 
It is noted that plaintiffs failed to prevail in nearly 
every phase of their complaint against Cascade defendants, 
including negligence, breach of implied warranty, implied 
warranty of good workmanship, express warranty of occupancy, 
implied warranty of habitability, implied warranty of fitness for 
intended purpose, consequential damages, breach of contract, 
alternate negligence and fraud. On the other hand Cascade defen-
dants sustained every claim made against plaintiffs at trial. 
-8-
The courts have consistently held the prevailing party in a 
suit is entitled to costs and attorney's fees when they are 
provided for by statute or contract. Besinger v. Behunin, 584 
P.2d 801 (Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert, Utah 567 P.2d 168 
(1977), Utah 93, IP.2d 950, 75 ALR 1393. 
CONCLUSION 
Cascade defendants have submitted to the court and to 
plaintiffs a proposed form of judgment that incorporates the 
necessary adjustments to the memorandum decision to render a 
final judgment in this case and to make way for this action to 
proceed on appeal. There is no question that resolution of the 
masonry defects issue, previous interest stipulation and costs 
are valid considerations that the court should rule upon in favor 
of Cascade defendants to facilitate final conclusion of this phase 
of litigation. 
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DEL K. BARTEL 
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Construction and Del K. Bartel 
DALE THURGOOD 
Attorney Pro Se for Defendants 
Cascade Enterprises, Cascade 
Construction and Dale Thurgood 
RTEL I/EgXALLAN BA
At torney Pro Se for Defendants 
Cascade Construction and 
Lee Allan Bartel 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore-
going CASCADE DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSI-
TION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CLARIFY, ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND 
FOR FINAL RULING UPON DEFENDANTS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS was hand-
delivered to plaintiff Robert J. DeBry's attorney, Alan L. Sullivan, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, Suite 1600, 50 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144; and mailed to plaintiff Joan 
DeBry, 5320 Baywood Circle, Holladay, Utah 84117, this c0QnO 
day of April, 1991. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. C86-653 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
MOTION IN RESPONSE TO 
COURT'S MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
ik * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 5, 1991 
* * * 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Debry vs. Cascade Enterprises et al., 
C86-553. Counsel will state an appearance 
MR. SULLIVAN: Alan Sullivan here today on behalf o 
the plaintiff Robert Debry. 
MR. HUGHES: Robert Hughes on behalf of Tri-K 
Contractors, your Honor, 
MR. THURGOOD: Dale Thurgood pro se. 
MR. LEE BARTEL: Lee Bartel pro se. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Del Bartel pro se. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Your Honor, Cascade defendants' 
motion is in response to the Court's memorandum decision, and 
involves several outstanding issues. While we had a 
discussion, a conference on April 5, I believe that there are 
still three matters that remained outstanding after that — 
after those discussions were held. 
THE COURT: Identify them for the record. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: The first one is the issue of 
masonry defect damage -- the masonry defects damage award of 
$30,000, included in the special verdicts form. The second 
issue involved the August 3, 1990 order after hearing. And 
the third item was Cascade defendants1 costs — attorney's 
fees and costs of court. 
In regard to the first issue, involving masonry 
2 
1 defects claims, the Cascade defendants contend that those 
2 issues were previously adjudicated at the prior severed trial 
3 which occurred on February 28 of 1990. At that time the 
4 plaintiffs and Tri-K Contractors, Sherwin Knudsen, entered 
5 into a stipulated settlement agreement, in which Cascade was a 
6 nominal party. We would point out to the Court that the — 
7 that Tri~K and the plaintiffs had previously discussed 
8 settlement prior to the trial. At the time of trial and after 
9 the jury had been selected, I believe it was Mr, Hughes, on 
10 behalf of Tri-K, indicated to the Court that there was an 
11 outstanding settlement possibility. The Court invited the 
12 plaintiffs and Tri-K to enter into further settlement 
13 discussions, if that was their wish. They chose to do that. 
14 And Cascade defendants were excluded from those discussions. 
15 Later on, a settlement, a stipulated settlement 
16 agreement was read onto the record by and between those 
17 parties. Mr. Hughes was then excused from that trial, and 
18 left here, and the Debrys attempted to pursue a consequential 
19 damage claim against Cascade defendants. At that time Cascade 
20 objected, saying that there was no proof of direct damages. 
21 That was why the panel was picked in the first place, was to 
22 determine what, if any, defects existed in the masonry in the 
23 building. Based upon Cascade's argument, the Court ruled 
24 that, in fact, consequential damages could not be heard at 
25 that time. 
3 
Plaintiffs then attempted to rescind the settlement 
agreement that they had entered into between themselves and 
Tri-K. Mr. Hughes was recalled from his office, back over to 
the Court. Further discussions were held. And the upshot of 
it was that Cascade defendants agreed to a stipulation that 
the masters panel report could be read at the main trial on 
the issue of consequential damages. There was some further 
argument in regard to the propriety of the structural 
engineers that were to be appointed on the panel, to make any 
decisions about contractor's licensing, building permits, and 
approved plans. And the Court ruled that, in fact, anybody 
could say anything at trial, and we were entitled to defend 
those issues at the main trial. 
Subsequently, at the main trial, the masters panel 
report was read, over the objections of Cascade defendants at 
various points. The jury ultimately made a ruling that the 
direct damage cost for the defects involving masonry would 
equal $30,000. Cascade contends that the only issue that 
could be heard at the main trial, in regard to masonry, was 
that issue involving the consequentials. We feel that the 
order at trial, on February 28, clearly enunciates what went 
on. It clearly describes what Cascade stipulated to. 
On item 6 of the order at trial, there is a 
series — it states as part of the written report referred to 
in paragraph 4 above, the panel would answer the following 
4 
1 specific questions. And there were six subparts to that 
2 question, which involved the building permit issue, the 
3 contractor's licensing issue and the issue of approved plans. 
4 I would note that the special verdicts form, the jury found 
5 that in fact Cascade defendants did have a contractor's 
6 license, that they did have a proper building permit, and that 
7 they did work under approved plans. Those were the only 
8 outstanding issues that involved that area of the order at 
9 trial. 
10 Our contention is we were excluded from the initial 
11 settlement agreement. Ultimate responsibility was accepted by 
12 Tri-K and Sherwin Knudsen. Plaintiffs accepted Sherwin 
13 Knudsen and Tri-K as having the ultimate responsibility to 
14 either repair or pay for the costs of the masonry defects. 
15 Therefore, any claim involving direct damages on the masonry 
16 would be held — Tri-K would be held ultimately responsible 
17 for. 
18 The second area that we address is the stipulation 
19 that occurred after trial, and it involved plaintiffs1 motion 
20 for stay of proceedings, which was heard on August 3 of 1990. 
21 Plaintiffs were seeking additional time to obtain the 
22 transcript of trial to pursue their motion for judgment 
23 notwithstanding the verdict; or, in the alternative, a new 
24 trial. And defendants had a concern that a substantial amount 
25 of time would elapse before the transcript would be available, 
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and they would then have an opportunity to review it and then 
respond to the Court. At that time plaintiffs agreed, 
specifically, to allow for a 12-percent interest to run on 
judgments in favor of the defendants from the date of the 
verdict on. And we asked the Court to acknowledge that. 
THE COURT: Is that a disputed issue today? 
MR. SULLIVAN: It is not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: The third issue involves costs. 
Cascade defendants believe that they are entitled to their 
costs of court, attorney's fees, and additional costs in 
proceeding with the case, consistent with Rule 54 (d)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and also in conjunction — 
which calls for -- states that the prevailing party is 
entitled to their costs. 
THE COURT: That's the question that has confronted 
the Court since the jury verdict was entered. Who is the 
prevailing party? 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Cascade's position is that the 
defendants had a -- their ninth amended complaint consisted of 
74 pages of accusations, of which two pages contained the 
defects, cited defects issue. There was 203 defects that were 
cited. The ultimate ruling by the jury was on three: 
miscellaneous damages, which were not cited in the complaint; 
architectural damages, which were not cited in the complaint; 
6 
and the masonry issue, which is part of our objection today. 
On the other hand, Cascade believes that, in fact, 
the special verdicts form shows that the jury sustained all 
the principal causes of action of the defendants, which 
included fraud, conspiracy, breach, and active interference. 
We further contend that the trust deed with 
assignment of rents -- leases, excuse me, which was signed by 
the parties, calls for the payment of costs in the event of a 
default. 
THE COURT: Cite the Court the appropriate language 
on which you rely. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Under paragraph 6 — 
THE COURT: Identify — 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Paragraph 6 of the trust deed note, 
number UT105660. MShould trustor fail to make any payment or 
to do any act as herein provided, then beneficiary or trustee, 
but without obligation to do so and without notice to or 
demand upon trustor and without releasing trustor from any 
obligation hereof, may make or do the same in such manner and 
to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the 
security hereof. Beneficiary or trustee being authorized to 
enter upon said property for such purposes, commence, appear 
in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect 
the security hereof or the rights or powers of the beneficiary 
or trustee, pay, purchase, contest or compromise any 
7 
encumbrance, charge or lien which, in the judgment of either, 
appears to be prior or superior hereto, and in exercising any 
such powers incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in 
its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefore, 
including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay 
his reasonable fees." 
THE COURT: Stop for just a moment. The Court has 
reached a preliminary decision on the awarding or nonawarding 
of fees and costs pursuant to Rule 54. The Court has some 
interest in plaintiffs1 response to the provision for fees and 
costs pursuant to the express language of the trust deed note. 
Would you like to respond? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I would be happy to, your Honor• 
First of all, on attorney's fees, these people have been 
representing themselves pro se in this case. I donft 
understand what they are arguing for award of attorney's fees. 
Secondly, costs, quite frankly, I did not understand 
the language that they read to entitle them to costs. 
Nevertheless — 
THE COURT: Would you like to refer to the language 
that was cited in the trust deed note? Take just a moment and 
refer to the appropriate language, and then you may respond. 
MR. SULLIVAN: It is correct, your Honor, that they 
are entitled to their attorney's fees, if they say so here, 
their costs, if they prevail in an action under the trust 
8 
1 deed. What I am trying to argue, your Honor, is that is the 
2 same rule as Rule 54 provides. That is, the prevailing party 
3 in any action is entitled to costs. It doesnft answer the 
4 question, who is the prevailing party? 
5 THE COURT: The Court would like to have further 
6 analysis on the record, relating to that question. There may 
7 be a legitimate dispute as to who the prevailing party, as 
8 such, is in this lawsuit, inasmuch as both parties were 
9 awarded some financial remuneration by the jury. The 
10 defendants are going to argue they are prevailing because they 
11 were awarded more money than the plaintiffs. The Court is 
12 convinced that there is recent case law that disputes that 
13 notion. 
14 However, the Court believes the defendants have a 
15 much stronger case in seeking and being awarded costs, 
16 clearly, and, perhaps, legal fees, if the argument of pro se 
17 representation is effectively met, under the express language 
18 of the trust deed note. The note itself provides that if 
19 action is taken for the protection or the enforcement of the 
20 trust deed note, the party incurlng those expenses is entitled 
21 to legal fees and costs if they prevail. That is the essence 
22 of the paragraph cited to the Court, is it not? 
23 MR. SULLIVAN: It is, your Honor. May I respond to 
24 that? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. Let's take it in reverse order. 
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1 Before addressing the question of whether or not the pro se 
2 defendants are entitled to legal fees, which, admittedly, is a 
3 more difficult matter to address, go to the costs. 
4 MR. SULLIVAN: I will, your Honor. If the Debrys 
5 had not been entitled to any damages, themselves, it seems 
6 clear to me, as the Court has observed, that these people 
7 would have a right to costs both under Rule 54 and under the 
8 contract. However, the Debrys have been awarded damages, and 
9 have been awarded other relief, by stipulation, that relates 
10 directly to the defendants1 entitlement -- entitlements under 
11 the trust deed note. 
12 What I am talking about, your Honor, is, in very 
13 simple terms, the Cascade people were owed some money under 
14 the trust deed note for the construction of a building. In 
15 this case, they have sought to enforce that right. The 
16 Debrys, on the other hand, have sought to enforce their right 
17 to be paid by Cascade defendants for defects in that very same 
18 building. 
19 Now, I can see a situation in which the Debrys may 
20 end up being owed more money by the defendants in this case 
21 than they owe the defendants. In other words, one of the 
22 defects in this case is the masonry defects. And Sherwin 
23 Knudsen is under an obligation, pursuant to the stipulation, 
24 to fix those masonry defects. And the masters panel that was 
25 appointed by the Court has estimated that the amount of money 
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necessary to pay for those masonry defects is going to be over 
$163,000. In addition to that, the Debrys have been awarded 
damages for other defects, in the amount of I think $22,000, 
from the Cascade defendants. 
Now, if plaintiffs are owed more by Cascade people 
and those with whom they contracted than the Cascade people 
are owed by the Debrys under the contract, I don't see how 
they can be held to have prevailed under this contract 
provision. I mean, it doesn't make sense that they would be 
entitled to attorney's fees, even under the contract, even 
under the trust deed note, if, as a result of this legal 
action, they end up owing the Debrys, or their contractor owes 
the Debrys for the construction of this very building, more 
than they are owed by the Debrys. In other words, they have 
got to prevail in some net fashion in order to actuate this 
contract provision. 
THE COURT: If the Court were to rule as follows, 
would they not be the prevailing party? And that is, that, 
pursuant to a contractual agreement, the defendants are not 
obligated for masonry defects, because that obligation was 
assumed by negotiated agreement with Tri-K and plaintiffs? 
Number one. And/or the defendants are the prevailing party 
because, even if they are obligated to the plaintiffs for 
masonry defects, the obligation can be satisfied with the 
payment of a $30,000 debt? 
11 
1 MR. SULLIVAN: I didn't quite understand the last 
2 part. 
3 THE COURT: The jury awarded a judgment in behalf of 
4 the plaintiff against the defendants for $30,000. If the 
5 Court rules that, irrespective of any agreement between Tri-K 
6 and the plaintiffs relating to masonry work, the sum total of 
7 the defendants' obligation to the plaintiff, regarding masonry 
8 work, is limited to $30,000, would they still not be the 
9 prevailing party? 
10 MR. SULLIVAN: No, they would not. Then what we 
11 have here, your Honor, is a conclusion that whoever gets the 
12 most -- whoever nets the most money is the prevailing party, 
13 And that in Utah is not the law. 
14 THE COURT: The Court agrees in principle with you. 
15 MR. SULLIVAN: I believe that's not the law in 
16 Utah. That's why I don't think they are entitled to recover 
17 costs. I mean, if they prevailed entirely on their contract 
18 action, with no offsets, and if the Court could conclude, 
19 therefore, that the Debrys were completely unjustified legally 
20 and factually in seeking, in effect, offsets, then they would 
21 clearly be the prevailing party. But that's not what happened 
22 here. There were offsets. As a result, there was this 
23 lawsuit, and neither party, in effect, was the prevailing 
24 party. Both parties got a portion of what they wanted. 
25 THE COURT: Respond to a third scenario propounded 
12 
Court in error? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I think the issue we are on now, I 
have lost that one issue, on interest, and what we are arguing 
about now --
THE COURT: Is the awarding of fees and costs — 
MR. SULLIVAN: On prevailing parties, I am saying 
both parties prevailed to a certain extent. My understanding 
of the cases of the Utah Supreme Court is that neither party 
is to be awarded costs in those instances. And that's our 
position. 
THE COURT: Anything further? The Court rules that 
any provision in the trust deed note that would provide the 
awarding of fees are inapplicable to the defendants, because 
they have not incurred in legal fees, set forth in affidavit 
form to the Court. 
Regarding the costs that are referred to in the 
trust deed note language, the Court finds that there was no 
prevailing party, consistent with the jury verdict, because 
damages were awarded in behalf of and against each party in 
the lawsuit. Therefore, fees and costs are not properly 
assessable under the provision of the trust deed note, because 
of no prevailing party. 
Now, is there any ambiguity regarding the ruling of 
the Court? 
MR. DEL BARTEL: If I may. I understand that, 
46 
1 because the Court has ruled there is no prevailing party in 
2 the case, there is no award of cost3. 
3 THE COURT: Or fees. 
4 MR. DEL BARTEL: However, the Court referenced the 
5 fact that we -- Cascade defendants failed to submit an 
6 affidavit of costs. Isn't it a fact that we have five days 
7 from the signing of the judgment to do that, if, in fact, the 
8 Court is going to deny on the prevailing party? 
9 THE COURT: The Court is denying the awarding of 
10 costs and fees because there is no prevailing party. The 
11 Court is also saying that, in addition thereto, legal fees 
12 could not be awarded, because they have not been incurred. 
13 You are pro se. 
14 MR. DEL BARTEL: We did have legal fees, though, 
15 your Honor. We had attorney fees, $27,000 worth, at the first 
16 of the case. That's what we were praying for. 
17 THE COURT: The Court will not address that issue, 
18 having found that fees and costs are not to be awarded, 
19 because there is no prevailing party, consistent with the 
20 language of the trust deed note. 
21 MR. SULLIVAN: I am assuming that interest — except 
22 for the trust deed note obligation, interest runs from the 
23 date of the jury verdict on all damages. 
24 MR. DEL BARTEL: I don't believe that's our 
25 contention -- our contention is that last August the 
47 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. , 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., ! 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff,
 t 
vs. ' 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., ; 
Defendant. ; 
i MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
) THE VERDICT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR ADDITUR, 
i OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
> FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUE 
) OF DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY 
i AND DAMAGES THEREFORE 
i Civil No. C86-553 
i JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Plaintiffs submit the following Memorandum in Support 
of Their Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in 
the alternative, for an additur, or in the alternative, for a new 
trial on the issues of defendants' liability and damages 
therefore. 
6. Breach of the following warranties: 
a) Occupancy; 
b) Defects in workmanship and materials; 
c) Warranty building built as required by 
Uniform Building Code. 
d) Habitability; 
e) Workmanship; 
f) Fitness for purpose. 
Those motions were based on the evidence set forth 
above. The motions were denied. Plaintiffs now have brought a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for 
additur or alternatively a new trial. 
The function of the rule allowing the court to enter 
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict is to permit the trial 
court to submit the case to the jury for their determination and 
then, if the verdict goes adverse to the moving party, the court 
can, when there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and 
rule upon whether a jury question truly exists. Roche v. Zee, 1 
Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855 (1953). In passing upon a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court is governed by 
the same rules as when passing upon a motion for directed 
verdict. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 
(1967). A directed verdict is appropriate when the court is able 
6 
to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would not 
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented. 
Management Committee v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1982). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff submits 
that reasonable minds could not differ on the uncontroverted 
evidence presented and that judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
should be entered as set forth herein below and the counterclaim 
of defendants dismissed. 
In the alternative, plaintiffs move for an additur, or 
alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD CANNOT BE LEGALLY 
SUPPORTED. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD 
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive 
damages in the sum of $125,000. For the reasons set forth 
hereinafter, said award cannot stand and must be vacated. 
The basis for the awarding of punitive damages in the 
State of Utah is set forth by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-
1(1)(a) provides: 
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TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD 
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive 
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Except as otherwise provided by statute, 
punitive damages may be awarded only if 
compensatory or general damages are awarded 
and it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and a 
disregard of, the rights of others. 
It is clear that only under the terms of the statute 
may punitive damages be awarded. 
For punitive damages to be awarded under the statute, 
two elements are necessary under Section 1(a). First, there must 
be a finding by the jury that the conduct of the tortfeasor is 
either: (a) willful and malicious, or (b) intentionally 
fraudulent or manifests knowing and reckless indifference toward 
the rights of others. Second, there must be an award of 
compensatory or general damages. 
It is the position of plaintiff that neither of these 
elements has been met, and that lack of either is sufficient to 
require the court to vacate the punitive damage award. 
1. Damage award. 
The statute, as well as case law, requires an award of 
general or compensatory damages to sustain a punitive damage 
award. The statutory requirement is consistent with the case law 
of Utah which has always required a general damage award in a law 
8 
case to sustain a punitive damage award. See, e.g., Maw v. Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District, 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 
(1968); Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954). 
The rule as set forth in Graham, supra is M[T]here can be no 
punitive damages without compensatory damages based on the tort." 
2 Utah 2d at 150. As the Graham court observed "[T]he failure to 
allege and prove a tort giving rise to compensatory damages 
vitiates the claim for punitive damage." Id. 
This statement of the Graham court is based upon two 
well accepted legal principles. First, punitive damages cannot 
be awarded for breach of contract. See, e.g., Continental 
National Bank v. Evans, 107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d 15 (1971); 
Williams v. Speedster, Inc., 175 colo. 73, 485 P.2d 728 (1971); 
Modern Air Conditioning Inc. v. Cinderella Homes Inc., 226, Kan. 
70, 596 P.2d 816 (1979); Purinqton v. Sound West, 566 P.2d 795 
(Mont. 1977); Fox v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1975); Waters 
v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972). Second, without an 
award of damages for the tort on which the punitive damage award 
is based, such award cannot stand. See, e.g., Graham v. Street, 
supra; LaFrentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969); 
Wagner v. Dan Unfuq Motors, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 
(1974); Boise Dodge Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 
(1969); Dold v. Sherow,. 220 Kan. 350, 552 P.2d 945 (1976); 
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Purinqton v. Sound West, supra; City of Reno v. Silver State 
Flying Service, Inc., 84 Nev. 170, 438 P.2d 257 (1968); 
Christman v. Voyer, 92 N.M. 772, 595 P.2d 410 (1979); State v. 
Brown, 519 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1974); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 
387, 498 P,2d 744 (1972) . 
In the present case, the jury gave only one damage 
award. The award was for breach of the trust deed note (a 
breach of contract). They then awarded $125,000 in punitive 
damages. 
The award of $62,500 plus interest was on defendants' 
first cause of action in the counterclaim. No punitive damages 
were sought for the breach of contract action nor could they be 
lawfully allowed under the cases cited above. 
In question 36 of the special interrogatories, the jury 
awarded recovery on the face amount of the Trust Deed Note plus 
interest. With respect to the claims of defendants to 
entitlement to general or compensatory damages for "costs spent 
after the sale" and "extras not paid for" the jury awarded $0 in 
each category. 
These two categories were the "general" or "compens-
atory" damages, an award of which is an absolute prerequisite 
under the statute and case law before a punitive damage award may 
stand. 
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Therefore, it is manifest that under the statute and 
cases cited herein, the punitive damage award of $125,000 must 
fail. 
In addition to the statutory requirement of general 
damages, before punitives may be awarded, the statute also 
requires a finding that the act for which punitive damages are 
awarded be either: (a) willful and malicious; (b) intentionally 
fraudulent; or (c) manifest a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward and disregard of the rights of others. 
This requires two things to occur before an award can 
stand: 
1. A finding of one of the above elements by the 
jury. 
2. Such finding must be based upon instructions to 
the jury defining the said elements and informing 
the jury of their necessity before punitives may 
be awarded. 
Since neither instructions nor a finding exist, the 
award cannot stand. 
Plaintiffs herein are entitled as a matter of law to 
have the punitive damage award stricken. 
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POINT II 
AS A HATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS DALE THURGOOD AND DEL 
BARTEL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE TRUST DEED 
AND NOTE AND NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSE 
THE SAME. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE 
TO VACATE THE AWARD 
The evidence in the case clearly shows that defendants 
Dale Thurgood and Del Bartel assigned all right, title and 
interest they possessed in the Trust Deed and Note for $62,500 
to Utah Title (Exhibits 11,12 & 13). 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise 
than by act or operation of law, or by deed 
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.. 
To paraphrase, "no estate or interest in real property 
. shall be . . . assigned . . . otherwise than • . . in 
writing subscribed by the party . . . assigning . . . the 
s ame. . . ." 
Therefore, by statute, the only way Thurgood and Bartel 
could ever again obtain an interest in the Trust Deed and Note 
(Exhibits 11 and 13) after having assigned away all of their 
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interest therein (Exhibit 12) would be by written assignment back 
from Utah Title. 
An oral assignment is impossible under Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-1, yet this is exactly what is claimed to have occurred. 
The jury made no finding that the defendants owned the Trust Deed 
and Note. 
The record in this case is devoid of any evidence to 
support a claim of interest of defendants in the Trust Deed and 
Note. By statute (25-5-1) the only method by which they could 
obtain any interest is a written assignment. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, Utah Title owns the 
Trust Deed and Note and the defendants herein have no right title 
or interest therein and lack standing to foreclose the same. 
Therefore, the court must dismiss count one of the 
counterclaim and vacate the jury's award thereunder, there being 
no evidence upon which such award can legally be based. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-10 PRECLUDES DEFENDANTS FROM 
MAINTAINING THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO 
DISMISS THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
In the present case, plaintiffs assert that Utah Code 
Ann. § 42-2-10 precludes suit herein by the Cascade defendants on 
their counterclaims. The language of the statute is clear. The 
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testimony of Mr, Van Alstyne, the Director of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code was clear. He stated that 
defendants Del Bartel, Lee Bartel and Dale Thurgood were not and 
had not at any previous time ever legally complied with the 
filing requirements of Section 42-2-5 and, therefore, the penalty 
provided in Section 42-2-10 was applicable. 
The court ruled that as a factual matter, Cascade 
defendants had made a good faith attempt to comply by attempting 
to file even though they could not legally file under the names 
Cascade Construction or Cascade Enterprises. 
Plaintiffs respectfully urge that such ruling is 
erroneous for the following reasons: 
The statute makes no provision for "good faith" 
attempts to comply. The statute is mandatory and provides for 
filing an assumed name at the time one commences business 
(Section 42-2-5). The risk one runs if one fails to comply with 
Section 42-2-5 at the time one commences business is that at some 
future date the chosen fictitious name will not be available for 
use. That is the contingency which has befallen defendants 
herein. For six years they ignored the mandate of Section 42-2-5 
and then, when faced with the penalty of Section 42-2-10, they 
found themselves unable to comply legally as the names were 
registered to another. 
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The crucial question involved is whether this court has 
the power to judicially create a "good faith" exception to the 
filing requirement of Section 42-2-5 and the ensuing penalty for 
non-compliance found in Section 42-2-10. 
It is a clearly accepted principle of law that a court 
has no power to enlarge the scope of a statute nor to amend it 
by judicial interpretation. Schroder v. Kansas State Highway 
Commission/ 199 Kan. 175, 428 P.2d 814 (1967); Anderson v. City 
of Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970). As observed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, "The court's primary responsibility in 
construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature." State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 
1987). See, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934, 
936 (Utah 1980); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 
755 (Utah 1982). The court's primary responsibility is to give 
effect to the legislature's intent. American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984). See, Murray City v. Hall, 
663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 
1977) . 
The legislative intent of Section 42-2-5 £t seq. is 
clear. There is no equivocation. The mandate is "File your dba 
before you do business or run the risk of not being able to use 
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the courts of this state until you can legally comply with 
Section 42-2-5. M 
Nowhere is there any statutory language regarding 
excuses for not filing or relating to good faith attempts to 
comply. The language is clear. Comply or you are barred from 
using state courts. 
There is no evidence in the record showing legal 
compliance with Section 42-2-5. The testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne 
is unequivocal that there was no compliance by the defendants 
herein who did not legally file under the name Cascade 
Construction Company and Cascade Enterprises. Therefore, the 
only avenue open to the court is to follow the legislative 
mandate of Section 42-2-10 and dismiss the counterclaims. 
Defendants must bear the burden of their failure to comply with 
the statutory mandate of Section 42-2-5. 
POINT IV 
THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF WARRANT AND NEGLIGENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes. . . 
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(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence or passion or prejudice. 
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate 
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the 
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant 
an additur to the verdict. In Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 
327 P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated: 
There is implicit within the authority of the 
court to grant a new trial on the statutory 
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages" 
the power to order a new trial conditionally; 
that is, to order that a new trial be granted 
unless the party adversely affected by the 
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of 
the damages to an amount within proper limits 
as viewed by the court. 
The Court explained that this process of modifying the 
verdict to bring it within the evidence is reserved for 
situations where the verdict is outside the limits of what 
appears justifiable under the evidence to such an extent that the 
verdict should not be permitted to stand. I_d. at 829. 
In Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 
(1953), the Utah Supreme Court explained the standard in 
determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows: 
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict 
presents a situation that such inadequacy or 
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury 
of the evidence or the instructions of the 
court as to the law applicable to the case as 
to satisfy the court that the verdict was 
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rendered under such disregard or misappre-
hension of the evidence or influence of 
passion or prejudice, then the court may 
exercise its discretion in the interest of 
justice and grant a new trial* 
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 701 (Utah) by stating that an 
additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the 
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; 
or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence." rd. a t 354. 
The plaintiff acknowledges that it is generally the 
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages. 
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978). Where, however, the 
standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can 
and should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the 
verdict within the limits of the evidence. Such is the case 
here. 
This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied 
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur. 
This is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict. The 
damage award of that verdict is inconsistent with the special 
verdicts rendered by that same jury. 
The jury found the defendants breached the implied 
warranty that the building would be built as required by the 
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Uniform Building Code (Question No. 4(a)), The court found as a 
matter of law, the masonry way negligently installed. The proper 
measure of damages is cost of repair of the code defects. 
Exhibits 205, 206, 207 and 208 establish code 
violations needing repair. Defendants offered no proof at trial 
that any specific code violations set forth in Exhibits 205, 206, 
207 or 200 had been repaired. While there was evidence that 
"repairs" were made, no evidence was produced to show what 
repairs were made, by whom, or that the repairs corrected any 
specific defect. 
Bill Karren testified and gave a bid to fix the said 
code defects. The defects needing repairs were categorized as 
follows: 
a) Masonry; 
b) Roof and floor; 
c) Trusses; 
d) Heating and plumbing; 
e) Electrical; 
f) Parking lot; 
g) West stair; 
h) architectural; and 
i) miscellaneous. 
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Bill Karren testified to the cost of repairs in each 
category. Defendants offered no contradictory or rebuttal 
testimony to show either: 
a) The repairs could be competently completed at a 
lesser charge; or 
b) Any specific repair was not needed. 
Therefore, the only competent evidence before the jury 
on cost of repair was that of Mr. Karren. 
There is no basis in the evidence for the amounts 
listed by the jury in answer to Question No. 18. Nor is there 
evidence in the record from which the said amounts listed by the 
jury could have been arrived at by mathematical calculation. It 
is clear that the numbers are random. It is also clear, however, 
that the jury found plaintiffs were entitled to recover the costs 
of repairs for code defects. 
When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the 
court usually leaves it as it is. When, however, there is no 
evidence to support an award, the court may take action to 
conform the award to the evidence. See, Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Skeen, supra. 
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation 
where inadequate damages are awarded. See, Bodon v. Suhrmann, 
supra. 
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In the present case, the Masters' panel found the cost 
of masonry repairs to be $161,885. Mr. Bill Karren testified 
the cost of repair would be $161,885. No contrary evidence was 
admitted at trial. As a minimum, the masonry repair costs should 
be increased from $30,800 to $161,885. 
Secondly, electrical repairs were $10,648 according to 
Bill Karren. No contrary evidence was admitted. The electrical 
award should be increased from $0 to $10,648. 
Additionally, the following awards should be increased 
since no contrary evidence was produced at trial. 
Floor and Roof $31,514 
Trusses 10,549 
TOTAL $42,063 
POINT V 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE A NEW TRIAL 
ON NEGLIGENCE, WARRANTY AND ON DAMAGES FOR 
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY 
The court ruled at trial and instructed the jury that 
defendants were negligent in constructing the building, yet the 
jury answered Question No. 1 that defendants were not negligent 
in constructing the building. 
The jury answered question no. 4 "yes" thereby finding, 
of necessity, that the building was constructed with code 
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violations (incliding of necessity the masonry defects). Having 
this ruled, and given the court's instruction that defendants 
were negligent in construction of the masonry, there is no 
logical basis for finding that the workmanship warranties were 
not breached. Also, there is no basis for the "no" answer to 
question no. 1. 
The court having ruled on the masonry defects (as a 
result of defendants stipulation to be bound thereby) there is no 
basis for finding there was no breach of warranties of occupancy 
and habitability. 
The only way the jury could have answered "no", as it 
did, on question nos. 1, 4(b) and 4(e) would be to totally ignore 
the court's instructions. 
Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the 
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial. 
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966); Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminant Domain, 236 
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart, 5 Ariz. App. 24, 
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Ry Co., 473 P.2d 549 (Mont. 
1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90 
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974) . 
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It has also been held that where the interrogatory 
answers are inconsistent, a new trial is justified. Van Cleve v. 
Betts, 16 Wash. App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977). 
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient 
evidence to support the jury verdict. Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra; Villeqas v. Bryson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61 
(1972). 
The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors 
made at the trial. In the present case, the jury made obvious 
errors in not following the court's instruction on negligence and 
warranty and in not answering Questions No. 2 & 3. There are 
obvious errors and failures to follow the evidence in the jury's 
answers to Question No. 10. 
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra: 
If is clearly appears that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice because the jury has. 
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted 
evidence where there is no rational basis for 
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that 
the jury has acted under a misconception of 
proven facts, or has misapplied or disre-
garded the law, or where it appears that the 
verdict was the result of passion and 
prejudice, it is both the prerogative and the 
duty of the court to set aside the verdict 
and grant a new trial. 
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not 
follow the evidence. In the event the court does not grant the 
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notwithstanding the verdict plaintiffs' motion for judgment and 
the additur motion, a new trial should be granted on defendants' 
liability and on the damages resulting therefrom. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's answers to the special verdict are not 
justified under the evidence in the case and should not be 
allowed to stand. This is especially true of the failure to rule 
on the proximate cause issue on negligence and damages therefore. 
The evidence at trial argues conclusively for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an additur as requested 
herein, or in the alternative, a new trial for plaintiffs as to 
the negligence issues and damages on negligence and warranty. 
DATED this ^ ry^ttay of June, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
*^ EDWARD T. W£LLS ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
y.JY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR 
ADDITUR, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUES OF 
DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY AND DAMAGES THEREFORE, (DeBry v. Cascade, 
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 3 day of June*, 
1990, to the following: 
Dale Thurgood 
190 South 350 West 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Del Bartel 
9264 South 3400 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Lee Allen Bartel 
110 Merrimac Court 
Vallejo, CA 94589 
SP3-730\jn 
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al., j 
Defendants. ] 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., | 
Defendant. ] 
i SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF 
> PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
) THE VERDICT, OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE, FOR ADDITUR, 
) OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
l FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUE 
) OF DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY 
) AND DAMAGES THEREFORE 
i Civil No. C86-553 
l JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN 
Pursuant to the court's order allowing re-submission of 
authority upon completion of the transcript, plaintiffs submit the 
following Substitute Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, for an 
additur, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the issues of 
defendants1 liability and damages therefore. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
At trial, the following facts were established by 
undisputed testimony. 
1. Cascade Enterprises has never lawfully filed as a 
partnership pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §42-2-5. 
(See, Exhibits 59 & 60; Tr. pp. 285, 301, 712, 1512, 1517, 1252.)! 
2. Cascade Construction Company has never lawfully 
filed as a partnership either under the name Cascade Construction 
or Cascade Construction Company pursuant to the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5. Id. 
3. The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 11 & 13) 
from Robert DeBry and Joan DeBry to defendants Del Bartel and Dale 
Thurgood were assigned in writing to Utah Title & Abstract and the 
assignment was recorded in the Salt Lake County recorder's office. 
(See, Exhibit 12; Tr. pp. 622, 1608-10, 1615, 1617.) 
4. No evidence was produced that Utah Title & Abstract 
Co. has ever given a written assignment of Exhibit 11 and 13 to 
defendants Thurgood and Bartel and defendants testified they have 
never received back an assignment of the Trust Deed and Note. (Tr. 
p. 1617.) 
*Those portions of the transcript cited herein are attached 
hereto as an appendix. 
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5. The Masters1 panel reported masonry defects in the 
building at 4252 South 700 East and the court ruled defendants were 
negligent in constructing the masonry. (See, Tr. 1647-48.) 
6. Defendants produced no evidence to refute the 
findings of the Masters1 panel. Id. 
7. Exhibit 207 lists electrical defects in the 
building. These defects were admitted by the electrician in 
requests for admission. No evidence was offered to dispute any of 
the said defective code violations. (See, Tr. pp. 1670-73, 740-41.) 
8. Bill Karren testified that the cost of repair of the 
electrical defects was $10,648. No testimony was received to 
dispute this amount. (Tr. p. 844, In. 2-6.) 
9. Bill Karen testified the cost of masonry repairs was 
$161,885. No testimony to the contrary was received. (Tr. p. 842, 
In 22.) 
10. The jury found that defendants breached an implied 
warranty to construct the building as required by the Uniform 
Building Code. (Special Interrogatory No. 4.) 
11. The jury awarded $5,000 for past repairs to the 
building. (Question No. 5.) 
12. The jury awarded $47,615 for repairs of building 
code violations. (Question No. 6.) 
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13. At trial, the unrefuted testimony was that code 
violation repairs (masonry, roof and floor, trusses, electrical) 
totalled $214,592. (Tr. pp. 842-45.) 
14. No testimony was offered by defendants to show: 
a) The cost of repair was not as testified by Bill 
Karren. 
b) Any of the repairs testified to by Mr. Karren to 
meet code were not needed. 
15. The repair costs of heating and plumbing ($24,200), 
west stair ($1,470), architectural ($37,268) and miscellaneous 
($11,816) contained code violation repairs, but such code viola-
tions were not delineated from other repairs. (Tr. pp. 842-45.) 
16. Defendants offered no evidence to refute the cost of 
moving to and from and leasing alternate office space as being the 
sum of $351,604.20. (See, Exhibit 245; Tr. pp. 693-98.) 
17. Defendants signed the escrow and non-merger 
agreement- on December 10. (Exhibit 6; Tr. pp. 1118-19.) 
18. The escrow and non-merger agreement (Ex. 6) was not 
prepared as part of the closing, but as a separate contract and was 
entered into on December 10. (Tr. pp. 1123-24.) 
19. The closing would not have occurred without the said 
contract (Ex. 6). Id. 
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20. The contract was acknowledged by Thurgood and Bartel 
on December 13, Tr. p. 785 In. 13 (testimony of Dale Thurgood); 
deposition of Wendy Harris (notary); Exhibit 6. 
21. Exhibit 12, the assignment of Trust Deed and Note 
was signed by both defendants and assigned all right, title and 
interest they had in the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Ex. 11, 
13) to Utah Abstract & Title Co. (See, Tr. pp. 622, 1609.) 
22. Utah Title mailed the Trust Deed back to Thurgood 
(Tr. p. 1615) but defendants do not have any documentation that the 
note or the trust deed were ever assigned back to them. (Tr. pp. 
1609-10.) 
23. Indeed, defendants do not have and did not produce 
the original Trust Deed Note which remains with Utah Title (see. 
Affidavit of Bradley C. Harr) and defendants have admitted that 
Utah Title has never assigned back either the Trust Deed or the 
Trust Deed Note. (Tr. p. 1617, In. 7-11.) 
24. The court ruled that warranties existed as to 
occupancy, Uniform Building Code, workmanship and materials, 
habitability and fitness for purpose. (Tr. pp. 1640-41.) 
25. Building permits issued by the county are always in 
writing and there is no such thing as an oral building permit. 
(Tr. p. 31.) 
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26. Exhibit 103 issued to defendants is a footings and 
foundation only permit and cannot legally be used to build other 
than footings and foundations. (Tr. p. 37.) 
27. There was no full building permit issued prior to 
1987. (Tr. pp. 56, 61.) 
28. Defendants constructed the building with a footings 
and foundation only permit. (Tr. pp. 131, 149, 183.) 
29. The only written permit defendants ever got from the 
county was Exhibit 103. (Tr. pp. 587, 983-84, 1090-91, 1219.) 
30. Defendants admitted they have no evidence to show 
other than a footings and foundation permit. (Tr. p. 626.) 
31. The original file of Salt Lake County relating to 
Exhibit 103 and the original application for a building permit in 
1984 has never been lost. (Tr. pp. 100, 174.) 
32. Exhibit 104 was the only set of plans submitted to 
the county prior to 1987. The said plans were not complete and 
were only approved for footings and foundations. (Tr. pp. 38, 165, 
570.) 
33. A stop work order on the building was issued 
(Exhibit 100). 
34. The county has no record of lifting the stop work 
order prior to 1987. (Tr. pp. 49, 148.) 
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35. The stop work order would not be lifted until the 
bounced check was made good, (Tr. p. 171.) 
36. Defendants did not make the bounced check good until 
1987. (Tr. p. 1076-78.) 
37. There is no evidence the stop work order was lifted 
prior to 1987. (Tr. pp. 49, 1106.) 
38. Doing inspection when there is no proper permit does 
not create a permit. (Tr. pp. 57, 104, 108, 167.) 
39. The fact the county may make on inspection and pass 
the building does not mean there are no defects or that existing 
defects have been corrected. (Tr. pp. 57, 112, 142, 167.) 
40. Salt Lake County ordered plaintiffs to vacate the 
building because of structural defects affecting the safety of the 
building. (Tr. pp. 63-67, 92, 109-10.) 
41. DeBry vacated the building because of the county 
order, id. (see, Tr. p. 693.) 
42. There was no evidence produced to show DeBrys had 
any other reason for vacating the building. 
43. Plaintiffs could not legally make the repairs to the 
building without a permit. (Tr. p. 61.) 
44. It was defendants1 responsibility to correct the 
defects. (Tr. p. 61.) 
45. Defendants acknowledged they warranted they would 
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meet code requirements. (Tr. p. 3 03.) 
46. The jury found that repair of code violations to the 
west stair would cost $625. (Question No. 18(g).) 
47. The jury found that repair of code violations in the 
architectural category would cost $7,000. (Question No. 18(h).) 
48. The jury found that repair of code violations in the 
miscellaneous category would cost $10,000. (Question No. I8(i).) 
49. The jury found that defendants suffered no general 
or special damages. (Question No. 36.) 
50. The only damages awarded to defen^^nt-^—W^FQ—for 
breach of contract on the Trust Deed Note^ (Question No. 3 6.) 
51. The jury awarded $125,000 punitive damages. 
(Question No. 3 6.) 
52. Defendants offered no specific evidence of any 
claimed defect cited as defective by plaintiffs resulting from work 
of subcontractors working for DeBry. 
53. Defendants offered no evidence of any specific work 
done to repair existing defects in the building. 
54. Exhibits 205, 206, 207 and 208 recite specific 
defects and code violations needing repair. 
55. Defendants offered no evidence to show that any code 
defects listed in Exhibit 205, 206, 207 and 208 had been repaired 
by them or their subcontractors. 
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Those motions were based on the evidence at trial as 
highlighted above. The motions were denied. Plaintiffs now have 
brought a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a 
motion for additur or alternatively a new trial. 
The function of the rule allowing the court to enter 
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict is to permit the trial 
court to submit the case to the jury for their determination and 
then, if the verdict goes adverse to the moving party, the court 
can, when there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and rule 
upon whether a jury question truly exists. Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 
193, 264 P.2d 855 (1953). In passing upon a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, the court is governed by the same 
rules as when passing upon a motion for directed verdict. Koer v. 
Mavfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). A directed 
verdict is appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts 
to be determined from the evidence presented. Management Committee 
v. Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). For the 
reasons set forth below, the plaintiff submits that reasonable 
minds could not differ on the uncontroverted evidence presented and 
that judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be entered as set 
forth herein below and the counterclaim of defendants dismissed. 
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In the alternative, plaintiffs move for an additur, or 
alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD CANNOT BE LEGALLY SUPPORTED. THE 
JURYfS VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD 
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive 
damages in the sum of $125,000. For the reasons set forth 
hereinafter, said award cannot stand and must be vacated. 
The basis for the awarding of punitive damages in the 
State of Utah is set forth in case law and by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, 
punitive damages may be awarded only if 
compensatory or general damages are awarded 
and it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, 
or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard 
of, the rights of others. 
It is clear that only under the rules set forth in case 
law, or under the terms of the statute may punitive damages be 
awarded. 
For punitive damages to be awarded under the statute, two 
elements are necessary under Section 1(a). First, there must be a 
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This statement of the Graham court is based upon two well 
accepted legal principles. First, punitive damages cannot be 
awarded for breach of contract. See, e.g., Continental National 
Bank v. Evans, 107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d 15 (1971); Williams v. 
Speedster, Inc. , 175 colo. 73, 485 P.2d 728 (1971); Modern Air 
Conditioning Inc. v. Cinderella Homes Inc. , 226, Kan. 70, 596 P.2d 
816 (1979); Purinqton v. Sound West, 566 P.2d 795 (Mont. 1977); Fox 
v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1975); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 
P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972). Second, without an award of damages for the 
tort on which the punitive damage award is based, such award cannot 
stand. See, e.g., Graham v. Street, supra; LaFrentz v. Gallagher, 
105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969); Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, 
Inc., 35 Colo. App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974); Boise Dodge Inc. v. 
Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969); Dold v. Sherow. 220 Kan. 
350, 552 P.2d 945 (1976); 
Purington v. Sound West, supra; City of Reno v. Silver State Flying 
Service, -Inc. , 84 Nev. 170, 438 P.2d 257 (1968); Christman v. 
Voyer, 92 N.M. 772, 595 P.2d 410 (1979); State v. Brown, 519 P.2d 
491 (Okla. 1974); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 498 P.2d 744 
(1972) . 
In the present case, the jury gave only one damage award. 
The award was for breach of the Trust Deed Note (a breach of 
contract). They then awarded $125,000 in punitive damages. 
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The award of $62,500 plus interest was on defendants' 
first cause of action in the counterclaim. No punitive damages 
were sought for the breach of contract action nor could they be 
lawfully allowed under the cases cited above. 
In question 3 6 of the special interrogatories, the jury 
awarded recovery on the face amount of the Trust Deed Note plus 
interest. With respect to the claims of defendants to entitlement 
to general or compensatory damages for "costs spent after the sale" 
and "extras not paid for" the jury awarded $0 in each category. 
These two categories were the "general" or "compensatory" 
damages, an award of which is an absolute prerequisite under the 
statute and case law before a punitive damage award may stand. 
Therefore, it is manifest that under the statute and 
cases cited herein, the punitive damage award of $125,000 must 
fail. 
In addition to the statutory and case law requirement of 
general damages, before punitives may be awarded, the statute also 
requires a finding that the act for which punitive damages are 
awarded be either: (a) willful and malicious; (b) intentionally 
fraudulent; or (c) manifest a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward and disregard of the rights of others. 
This requires two things to occur before an award can 
stand: 
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1. A finding of one of the above elements by the jury. 
2. Such finding must be based upon instructions to the 
jury defining the said elements and informing the 
jury of their necessity before punitives may be 
awarded. 
Since neither instructions nor a finding exist, the award 
cannot stand. 
Plaintiffs herein are entitled as a matter of law to have 
the punitive damage award stricken. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS DALE THURGOOD AND DEL 
BARTEL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE TRUST DEED 
AND NOTE AND NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSE 
THE SAME. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE 
TO VACATE THE AWARD 
The evidence in the case clearly shows that defendants 
Dale Thurgood and Del Bartel assigned all right, title and interest 
they possessed in the Trust Deed and Note for $62,500 to Utah Title 
(Exhibits 11,12 & 13; Tr. pp. 622,1608-10, 1615, 1617.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, 
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granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
To paraphrase, "no estate or interest in real property . . . 
shall be . . - assigned . . . otherwise than . . . in writing 
subscribed by the party . . . assigning . . . the same. . . .n 
Therefore, by statute, the only way Thurgood and Bartel 
could ever again obtain an interest in the Trust Deed and Note 
(Exhibits 11 and 13) after having assigned away all of their 
interest therein (Exhibit 12) would be by written assignment back 
from Utah Title. Defendants testified they never received back 
such an assignment. (Tr. p. 1609-10.) 
An oral assignment is impossible under Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-1. The jury did not and could not, on the evidence, make a 
finding that the defendants owned the Trust Deed and Note. 
The record in this case is devoid of any evidence to 
support a claim of interest of defendants in the Trust Deed Note. 
By statute (25-5-1) the only method by which they could obtain any 
interest is a written assignment. Defendants testified the trust 
deed had been sent back to them (Tr. p. 1615) but they never 
received back the note upon which their claim is based. (See, 
Affidavit of Bradley C. Harr.) (Original note still held by Utah 
Title.) 
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Therefore, as a matter of law, Utah Title owns the Trust 
Deed and Note and the defendants herein have no right title or 
interest therein and lack standing to foreclose the same. (See, 
Affidavit of Robert D. Schmidt.) 
The court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion was based 
upon the erroneous assumption there was testimony that the note and 
trust deed had been assigned back to defendants. (See, Tr. p. 
1635.) This is not true. Thurgood testified there had been no 
assignment back. (Tr. p. 1609-10.) The court's ruling, having 
been based upon a misunderstanding of the testimony, should now be 
reversed. 
Therefore, the court should dismiss count one of the 
counterclaim and vacate the jury's award thereunder, there being no 
evidence upon which such award can legally be based. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 42-2-10 PRECLUDES DEFENDANTS FROM 
MAINTAINING THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO 
DISMISS THEIR COUNTERCLAIM 
In the present case, plaintiffs assert that Utah Code 
Ann. § 42-2-10 precludes suit herein by the Cascade defendants .on 
their counterclaims. The language of the statute is clear. The 
testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne, the Director of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code was clear. He stated that 
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defendants Del Bartel, Lee Bartel and Dale Thurgood were not and 
had not at any previous time ever legally complied with the filing 
requirements of Section 42-2-5 and, therefore, the penalty provided 
in Section 42-2-10 was applicable. 
The court ruled that as a factual matter, Cascade 
defendants had made a good faith attempt to comply by attempting to 
file even though they could not legally file under the names 
Cascade Construction or Cascade Enterprises. 
The stated basis for the court's ruling was good faith 
compliance by defendants. However, it can hardly be considered 
good faith compliance to not comply for over five years and then 
rush to file after a motion to dismiss has been filed based upon 
the previous conduct of ignoring the requirement. If the 
defendants were acting in good faith, they would have filed when 
they went into business and not waited until June 14, 1990 after 
the motion to dismiss was submitted to the court. Defendants 
admitted that when they filed they were told it would take 48-72 
hours to clear the name. (Tr. p. 1255.) This period is to allow 
the state to make sure the name is not already owned by someone 
else. Having been so informed, they cannot claim in good faith 
they relied upon the filing or were damaged when it was determined 
they could not legally use the names filed for which had been 
legally registered to another. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully urge that such ruling is 
erroneous for the following reasons: 
The statute makes no provision for "good faith" attempts 
to comply. There is no case law to support such an exception. The 
statute is mandatory and provides for filing an assumed name at the 
time one commences business (Section 42-2-5). (Emphasis added.) 
The risk one runs if one fails to comply with Section 42-2-5 at the 
time one commences business is that at some future date the chosen 
fictitious name will not be available for use. (The event which 
occurred in this case.) That is the contingency which has befallen 
defendants herein. For six years they ignored the mandate of 
Section 42-2-5 and then, when faced with the penalty of Section 42-
2-10, they found themselves unable to comply legally as the names 
were registered to another. 
The crucial question involved is whether this court has 
the power to judicially create a "good faith" exception to the 
filing requirement of Section 42-2-5 and the ensuing penalty for 
non-compliance found in Section 42-2-10• 
It is a clearly accepted principle of law that a court 
has no power to enlarge the scope of a statute nor to amend it by 
judicial interpretation. frafrrfgaeg v. Kanfefla Sfcata Blerhway 
Commission, 199 Kan. 175, 428 P.2d 814 (1967); Anderson v. Citv of 
Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970). As observed by the 
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Utah Court of Appeals, "The court's primary responsibility in 
construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature.11 State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). 
See, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 
1980); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 
1982). The court's primary responsibility is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent. American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1, 
3 (Utah 1984). .See, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 
1983); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977). 
The legislative intent of Section 42-2-5 et seq. is 
clear. There is no equivocation. The mandate is "File your dba 
before you do business or run the risk of not being able to use the 
courts of this state until you can legally comply with Section 42-
2-5." If through negligence or inadvertence there is no 
compliance, no suit can be maintained. There is no basis for being 
allowed to sue merely because you tried. 
Nowhere is there any statutory language regarding excuses 
for not filing or relating to good faith attempts to comply. The 
language is clear. Comply or you are barred from using state 
courts. 
There is no evidence in the record showing legal 
compliance with Section 4 2-2-5. The testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne 
is unequivocal that there was no compliance by the defendants 
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herein with the provision of the statute and that defendants did 
not legally file under the name Cascade Construction Company or 
Cascade Enterprises. (See, Tr. pp. 1512, 1517.) Therefore, the 
only avenue open to the court is to follow the legislative mandate 
of Section 42-2-10 and dismiss the counterclaims. Defendants must 
bear the burden of their longstanding failure to comply with the 
statutory mandate of Section 42-2-5. 
POINT IV 
THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES 
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes. . . 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence or passion or prejudice. 
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate 
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the 
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant 
an additur to the verdict. In Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 
P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated: 
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There is implicit within the authority of the 
court to grant a new trial on the statutory 
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages" 
the power to order a new trial conditionally; 
that is, to order that a new trial be granted 
unless the party adversely affected by the 
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of 
the damages to an amount within proper limits 
as viewed by the court. 
The Court explained that this process of modifying the 
verdict to bring it within the evidence is reserved for situations 
where the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justifiable 
under the evidence to such an extent that the verdict should not be 
permitted to stand. Id. at 8 29. 
In Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671 
(1953), the Utah Supreme Court explained the standard in 
determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows: 
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict 
presents a situation that such inadequacy or 
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of 
the evidence or the instructions of the court 
as to the law applicable to the case as to 
satisfy the court that the verdict was 
rendered under such disregard or misappre-
hension of the evidence or influence of 
passion or prejudice, then the court may 
exercise its discretion in the interest of 
justice and grant a new trial. 
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 701 (Utah) by stating that an 
additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the 
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or 
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misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 3 54. 
The plaintiff acknowledges that it is generally the 
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages. 
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978). Where, however, the 
standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can and 
should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the verdict 
within the limits of the evidence. Such is the case here. 
This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied 
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur. This 
is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict. The damage 
award of that verdict is inconsistent with the special verdicts 
rendered by that same jury. 
The jury found the defendants breached the implied 
warranty that the building would be built as required by the 
Uniform Building Code (Question No. 4(a)). The court found as a 
matter of- law, the masonry was negligently installed. The proper 
measure of damages is cost of repair of the code defects and 
recovery for all damages proximately caused by the defective 
construction. 
Exhibits 205, 206, 207 and 208 and the master's report 
establish code violations needing repair. Defendants offered no 
proof at trial that any specific code violations set forth in 
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Exhibits 205, 206, 207 or 208 had been repaired and the defects in 
the master's report were extant. While there was evidence that 
some "repairs" had been made, no evidence was produced to show what 
repairs were made, by whom, or that the repairs corrected any 
specific defect. 
Bill Karren testified and gave a bid to fix the existing 
code defects. The defects needing repairs were categorized as 
follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
-i) 
Bill 
Masonry; 
Roof and floor; 
Trusses; 
Heating and plumbing; 
Electrical; 
Parking lot; 
West stair; 
architectural; and 
miscellaneous. 
Karren testified to the cost of repairs in each 
category, (Tr. pp. 842-845.) Defendants offered no contradictory 
or rebuttal testimony to show either: 
a) The repairs could actually be competently completed 
at a lesser charge; or 
b) Any specific repair was not needed. 
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Therefore, the only competent evidence before the jury on 
cost of repair was that of Mr. Karren. 
Salt Lake County ordered plaintiffs to vacate the 
building because of structural defects affecting the safety of the 
building. (Tr. pp. 63-67, 92, 109-10.) Plaintiffs vacated the 
building because of the court order. (Tr. p. 693.) No evidence 
was produced that there was any other reason plaintiffs vacated the 
building. The costs to DeBry of vacating the building and renting 
alternate space was $351,604.20. (Tr. p. 6981; see Exhibit 245.) 
Defendants offered no evidence to dispute the said costs nor was 
evidence offered to dispute the fact that the structural defects 
shown by the master's report created the safety problems. Carl 
Eriksson testified the masonry was one of the reasons for the 
eviction. (Tr. p. 66.) Absent the structural problems shown by 
the master's report, eviction would not have been pursued. (Tr. p. 
67.) No~ evidence was adduced to refute the testimony of Carl 
Eriksson that the masonry problems (structural problems) were 
responsible for the eviction. Therefore, there is no competent 
evidence from which the jury could conclude other than the 
structural problems caused by the defective masonry caused the 
eviction of plaintiffs from the building and the resultant damages 
of $351,604.20. 
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There is no basis in the evidence for the amounts listed 
by the jury in answer to Question No. 18. Nor is there evidence in 
the record from which the said amounts listed by the jury could 
have been arrived at by mathematical calculation. It is clear that 
the numbers are random. It is also clear, however, that the jury 
found plaintiffs were entitled to recover costs of repairs for code 
defects. 
In Call v. Manti City Corporation, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 
(1990), the court was presented with a situation similar to the 
case at bar. The jury awarded damages in an amount significantly 
less than that testified to by plaintiff's expert, and which amount 
was not rebutted by other competent evidence. In handling the 
problem, the Court of Appeals stated: 
It is true that Call's evidence regarding 
damages was not entirely uniform. However, 
the evidence clearly established general 
damages in an amount for exceeding what the 
-jury awarded. Id. at 32. 
Testimony was received at trial as to a high and a low on 
what the damages for loss of profits could be. Call's argument was 
that the jury could not award less than the minimum amount of 
damage shown by competent evidence at trial and that the trial 
court had erred in not directing a verdict for at least the minimum 
damage shown by the evidence. The appeals court agreed and stated: 
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While plausible views of the evidence might 
have led to fixing a damage award at certain 
other levels within this broad range, no 
evidence of record, nor any disciplined view 
of the evidence of record, would support an 
award outside this range. Call made timely 
motions for a directed verdict, and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in the 
amount shown by the most conservative view of 
the evidence, $56,377.60. On appeal, although 
it would settle for a new trial, Call 
principally argues the court erred, given the 
lack of any contrary evidence, in not 
directing a verdict or judgment in this 
minimal amount and that we should remand with 
instructions to do so. 
A trial court's refusal to direct a verdict 
will not be sustained when, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party who resisted the motion, reasonable 
minds would necessarily accept the evidence 
relied on by the moving party. See, e.g. , 
White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983). 
Similarly, a refusal to enter a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict will be reversed 
when the part so moving is entitled to the 
judgment requested as a matter of law. See, 
e.g. , Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 
1988) . 
In this case, while reasonable minds could 
differ on whether Call was entitled to more, 
the evidence established it was clearly 
entitled to judgment in at least the amount of 
$56,377.60. Upon proper motions by Call, the 
court erred in not directing a verdict or 
granting judgment in that amount. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judgment which was 
entered on the jury's verdict and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in the 
principal amount of $56,377.60. Id. at 33. 
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When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the 
court usually leaves it as it is. When, however, there is no 
evidence to support an award, the court may take action to conform 
the award to the evidence. gee, Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District v. Skeen, supra. 
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation 
where inadequate damages are awarded. See, Bodon v. Suhrmann, 
supra. 
In the present case, the Masters1 panel found the cost of 
masonry repairs to be $161,885. Mr. Bill Karren testified the cost 
of repair would be $161,885. No contrary evidence was admitted at 
trial. As a minimum, the masonry repair costs should be increased 
from $30,800 to $161,885. 
Secondly, electrical repairs were $10,648 according to 
Bill Karren. No contrary evidence was admitted. The electrical 
award should be increased from $0 to $10,648. 
Additionally, the following awards should be increased 
since no contrary evidence was produced at trial. 
Roof and Floor Repairs $31,514 
Truss Repairs 10,549 
Heating and Plumbing 24,200 
West Exit Stairs 1,470 
Architectural Costs 37,268 
Miscellaneous Items n f 816 
TOTAL COST OF ALL REPAIRS $333,515 
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In addition, the moving and alternate space leasing costs 
were established at $351,604.20. No evidence to refute this amount 
was given and so the award should be increased to cover this damage 
which was undeniably shown to result from the masonry defects upon 
which judgment was directed for plaintiffs. 
POINT V 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE A NEW TRIAL 
ON NEGLIGENCE, WARRANTY AND ON DAMAGES FOR 
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY 
The court ruled at trial and instructed the jury that 
defendants were negligent in constructing the building, yet the 
jury answered Question No. 1 that defendants were not negligent in 
constructing the building. 
The jury answered question no. 4 "yes" thereby finding, 
of necessity, that the building was constructed with code 
violations (including of necessity the masonry defects). Having 
thus ruled, and given the court's instruction that defendants were 
negligent in construction of the masonry, there is no logical basis 
for finding that the workmanship warranties were not breached. 
Also, there is no basis for the "no" answer to question no. 1. 
Also, the court ruled and defendants stipulated to a breach of 
workmanship warranty. (Tr. p. 164 0.) 
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The court having ruled on the masonry defects (as a 
result of defendants stipulation to be bound thereby) and 
defendants having so stipulated, there is no basis for finding 
there was no breach of warranties of occupancy and habitability. 
The only way the jury could have answered "no", as it 
did, on question nos. 1, 4(b) and 4(e) would be to totally ignore 
the court's instructions and act out of prejudice or passion. 
Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the 
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial. 
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 
(1966); Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminant Domain, 236 
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart, 5 Ariz. App. 24, 
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Rv Co., 473 P.2d 549 (Mont. 
1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90 
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974). 
It has also been held that where the interrogatory 
answers are inconsistent, a new trial is justified. Van Cleve v. 
Setts, 16 Wash. App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977). 
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient 
evidence to support the jury verdict. Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra; Villeaas v. Brvson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61 
(1972) . 
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The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors 
made at the trial. In the present case, the jury made obvious 
errors in not following the court's instruction on negligence and 
warranty and in not answering Questions No. 2 & 3. There are 
obvious errors and failures to follow the evidence in the jury's 
answers to Question No. 18. 
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra: 
If is clearly appears that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice because the jury has 
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted 
evidence where there is no rational basis for 
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that 
the jury has acted under a misconception of 
proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded 
the law, or where it appears that the verdict 
was the result of passion and prejudice, it is 
both the prerogative and the duty of the court 
to set aside the verdict and grant a new 
trial. 
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not 
follow the evidence. In the event the court does not grant the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiffs' motion 
for judgment and the additur motion, a new trial should be granted 
on defendants' liability and on the damages resulting therefrom. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury's answers to the special verdict are in conflict 
and not justified under the evidence in the case and should not be 
allowed to stand. This is especially true of the failure to rule 
on the proximate cause issue on negligence and damages therefore. 
The evidence at trial argues conclusively for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and an additur as requested herein, or 
in the alternative, a new trial for plaintiffs as to the negligence 
issues and damages on negligence and warranty. 
DATED this l£ day of October, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
EDWARD T. WELLS 
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General Supervision - Subs 950.00 
Fees - Engineering, specs, as^builts, permit 7,000.00 
Materials - Structural steel tube and plate, metal 
window framing, toilet partitions, grab bars, 
door closers, smoke seal, sheetrock, oak 
framing, studs, bolts, epoxy, concrete, 
paint, door hardware 7,350.95 
Labor 
Structural and related $3,552.00 
Toilet partitions, door closers, 
smoke seal 1,525.00 
Framing, wall repair 900.00 
Metal window framing 1,200.00 
Outside stair repair 875.00 
Tenting lighting 1,012.50 
General repair - grid blocking, 
piping, etc. 1,625.00 
Cleanup 95.00 
Delivery 133.63 10,918.13 
$27,719.81 
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A. It 
plans on that 
MR. 
THE 
(A 1 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Any 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
stand. 
THE 
is planned that way, yes. They had original 
job. 
WELLS: May I have a moment, your Honor? 
COURT: You may. 
Oriel pause in the proceedings.) 
WELLS: That's all I have. 
COURT: Redirect? 
DEL BARTEL: None, your Honor. 
COURT: You may step down. Have a nice day. 
objection to the witness being excused? 
WELLS: We have none. 
COURT: Call your next witness. 
DEL BARTEL: We would call Dale Thurgood to the 
COURT: You have been previously sworn. 
DALE THURGOOD, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendants, being 
previously sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DEL BARTEL: 
Q. Mr. 
reentered the 
What prompted 
Thurgood, you previously testified that Cascade 
building to make repairs in the fall of 1987. 
that action? 
A. There was a hearing held in this courtroom, in which 
all of the parties to the suit at that time agreed that it 
1560 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
would be 
problems 
Q. 
a wise idea to go in and try and 
there were, in order to mitigate 
Did 
that hearing? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, 
a scheduling and management 
it did. 
I show you what has been labeled 
you recognize 
A. 
that document? 
This is a copy of the scheduling 
drafted by the plaintiffs1 attorney, Dale 
of 1987. 
Q. 
prepared' 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did 
? 
Yes, 
Did 
Yes, 
Did 
as well as the 
A. 
attached 
original. 
Q. 
building 
order? 
A. 
Q. 
you review that document aft 
I did. 
you sign it? 
I did. 
you sign a specific addendum 
» original signing? 
fix wnatever alleged 
the litigation. 
order develop from 
i as Exhibit AAA. Do 
order which was 
Gardiner, in August 
er it had been 
at that time to it, 
I affixed my signature to it, subject to the 
addendum which we sent with it when we signed the 
Did you proceed to take all the steps to reenter the 
and correct cited defects based upon that scheduling 
Yes, 
Did 
we did. 
you incur substantial costs as a result of that 
1561 
1 document? 
2 A. Yes, sir. 
3 Q. I would like to refer you to paragraph 7 of the 
4 initial document, of the order itself. Would you read that to 
5 the jury. 
6 A. "Thereafter, Cascade defendants and their 
7 subcontractors, agents and employees shall have access to the 
8 building up tnrough November 2, 1987, for the purpose of 
9 correcting the alleged defects and code violations set forth 
10 in the plaintiffs' affidavits for summary judgment heard by 
11 the Court on July 20, 1987. Those affidavits were submitted 
12 by Kenneth Karren, Jr., Niels Valentiner, Ted Wilson, Frank 
13 Liebrock. In carrying out their work, Cascade defendants will 
14 not further encumber the building. They will provide 
15 liability insurance for their workers. Cascade shall provide 
16 a copy of this order to all subcontractors who work on the 
17 property." 
18 Q. Were those the same affidavits that Mr. Wells 
19 referred to earlier in trial as the documents that he insisted 
20 that we had reviewed or relied upon? 
21 A. Those were the same affidavits Mr. Wells spent two 
22 days grilling me on. 
23 Q. Would you read paragraph 8 of the document. 
24 A. "Plaintiffs1 expert witnesses shall be --
25 plaintiffs' experts shall reasonably cooperate with Cascade 
1562 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al. , 
Defendants. 
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. C86-5S3 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
JURY TRIAL 
VOLUME V 
* * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
June 6, 1990 
* * * 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
I N D E X 
WITNESSES VOIR 
POR THE PLAINTIFFS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS DIRE 
Stanley S. Postma 664 
Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. 673 
Stanley S. Postma 674 681, 685 686 
David L. Morton 
Dale Thurgood 703 748, 757 
Kenneth W. Karren, Jr. 810 
674 
692 
681 
5 
698 
 
757 
767 
663 
the noon recess, remember the previous admonition of the 
Court. Do not discuss the case among yourselves, do not 
permit anyone to discuss the case in your presence, do not 
form nor express an opinion in this matter until it has been 
submitted to you for your deliberation and your decision. 
Have a nice lunch. The Court will be in recess until 1:30. 
(A lunch recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the presence of 
the jury, the alternate, counsel and the parties. You may 
proceed. 
MR. WELLS: Before we proceed, as your Honor will 
recall, I indicated to you during the recess that Mr. Debry 
had a personal matter that would necessitate his being absent 
for an hour or two. The Court has indicated there will be no 
problem with that. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that the absence 
was noted to the Court in advance. 
Q. Mr. Thurgood, Mr. Wells previously contended that 
you did not go out and hire new engineers when defect reports 
began to flow from the Debrys. Why not? 
MR. WELLS: Your Honor, I am going to object to the 
form of the question. The testimony was that the defect 
reports came from engineers, not from the Debrys. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. Why didn't you go out and hire new engineers when 
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1 you received the various defect reports that Mr. Debry showed 
2 you here today? 
3 A. We had contractual obligations with all of our 
4 subcontractors who had performed the work, which was being 
5 alleged as defective, and felt that those subcontractors were 
6 competent and certainly had the right to address those issues, 
7 and we had a legal obligation to allow them to do so. 
8 Q. Did you subsequently contact those subcontractors? 
9 A. Yes, we did. 
10 Q. Why was there a delay between the time that you saw 
11 the reports and that subcontractors or Cascade reentered the 
12 building to address them? 
13 A. At the end of 1986 and into 1987, through about 
14 August or September, we were locked off of that job, and it 
15 was in September we finally received a court order, allowing 
16 us to go into that building. 
17 Q. Isn't it true that even when we got — when the 
18 first court order was obtained to enter the building, that 
19 Debrys still prevented that entering? 
20 A. That's true. 
21 Q. Did the subcontractors subsequently go back into the 
22 building in 1987? 
23 A. Yes, they did. 
24 Q. Prior to their reentering the building, was a new 
25 building permit obtained from the county? 
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1 A. We obtained a new building permit in November 1987, 
2 prior to their being allowed to start any work. 
3 Q. Wasn't that permit based upon a new set of plans and 
4 specifications? 
5 A, Yes, it was. 
6 Q. Wasn't it also based upon the report of David 
7 Christensen, who is an engineer? 
8 A. His report was included with the new plans, yes. 
9 Q. And wasn't the reports of the plaintiffs, that were 
10 presented here today — weren't they included and presented to 
11 the county? 
12 A. The county utilized those reports in going over the 
13 new plans — 
14 MR. WELLS: I am going to object, move to strike his 
15 testifying as to what the county did. I don't think there is 
16 any basis for that. 
17 THE COURT: Sustained. 
18 MR. WELLS: May it be stricken? 
19 THE COURT: That portion that refers to matters that 
20 are beyond the firsthand knowledge of the witness are 
21 stricken. 
22 Q. Mr. Thurgood, did you meet with Carl Eriksson of the 
23 county to review the plans and specifications? 
24 A. Yes, I did. 
25 Q. Did Mr. Eriksson show you reports that he received 
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from the Debrys? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Were those reports -- did they reflect essentially 
the same items that were discussed here today? 
MR. WELLS: Objection, the reports are the best 
evidence of what they reflected. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Isn't it true that the county issued a second 
permit, and approved a second set of plans, based upon all 
that input? 
A. They did. 
Q. Isn't it also true that the subcontractors reentered 
the building, based upon all of the new information that was 
presented to the county and approved? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And isn't it also true that at each inspection that 
was made on the building, after the subcontractors had 
performed work again, and readdressed all those issues, that 
the plaintiffs1 engineer was called prior to every inspection, 
to allow him to enter onto the premises at the time of the 
inspection? 
A. Yes. 
MR. WELLS: Objection, foundation. May we have some 
foundation? 
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THE COURT: Overruled. It is a matter for redirect. 
Q. Do you know for a fact that plaintiffs1 engineers 
were called prior to the county agreeing to make inspections 
on that building? 
A. I was present or in the presence of county 
inspectors when they called, at least Mr. Karren, and held the 
inspections -- not Bill Karren, Jr., I believe his father — 
until he arrived, before those inspections were held. 
Q. Wasn't the building approved again by the county, 
subject to a set of items that needed to be completed? 
MR. WELLS: Objection, calls for a conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Didn't this Court call upon the county to provide an 
affidavit, outlining the items that needed to be completed in 
the building, subsequent to those inspections? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Was an affidavit subsequently provided? 
A. Carl Eriksson provided one to the Court. 
MR. DEL BARTEL: Your Honor, if I may. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. Mr. Thurgood, I will show you what is labeled 
Exhibit L. Is that the affidavit that Carl Eriksson, or a 
copy of it, that Carl Eriksson provided to the Court? 
A. Yes, it is. 
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1 Q. In reviewing that document, what items needed to be 
2 addressed for final occupancy to be given on the building? 
3 MR. WELLS: Objection, the document is hearsay. It 
4 hasn't been admitted. It is improper to read a document 
5' unadmitted. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained. 
7 MR. DEL BARTEL: I ask that the document be 
8 admitted. 
9 MR. WELLS: Objection, hearsay. 
10 THE COURT: What is the document? 
11 (A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
12 THE COURT: Approach the bench, please. 
13 (An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
14 Q. Were you informed by the county, after a series of 
15 inspections had been made on the building, pursuant to going 
16 in in 1987, what remained to be done? 
17 A. After — 
18 MR. WELLS: Your Honor, it calls for a yes or a no. 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What remained to be done? 
21 MR. WELLS: Objection, hearsay. 
22 THE COURT: Overruled. 
23 A. After the last inspection, which I attended, was 
24 held by the county, I was informed there were four items left 
25 to be addressed before certificate of occupancy would be 
795 
issued. 
Q. Do you recall those four items? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And what are they? 
A. That either wire glass had to be installed in the 
south side of the building, and a parapet wall installed on 
the south side of the building, or, in the alternative, a 
four-foot easement or purchase of property from the neighbor 
on the south, that door coordinators had to be put on the two 
sets of eight-foot doors in the building, and that a broken 
truss had to be repaired. 
Q. To the best of your knowledge, right today, have 
those items been resolved? 
A. Every one. 
Q. Are you aware of the plaintiffs submiting any other 
documents to the county, citing any further defects? 
A. I don't know whether they have, or not. I don't 
believe so. I may retract that. They probably haven't sent 
them a copy of the Master's report. 
Q. Mr. Thurgood, questions were given to you with 
regard to Valley Mortgage making any extensions on the 
construction loan on that building. Your response was — the 
question was, were there any further extensions after October? 
And you said yes. Did you ever receive a document which 
showed that Valley Mortgage was willing to extend that loan? 
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AMENDED NOTICE OP CLAIHS 
Pursuant to the Order of the Court, given in open court 
on May 20, 1994, Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry herewith provide 
the following notice to Dale Thurgood and Del Bartel of the nature 
of the claims presently being made by the DeBrys against the escrow 
funds which the Trustee has available for distribution from the 
Utah Title escrow. 
1. The monies held by the Trustee were escrowed at the 
time of closing to pay amounts due to subcontractors and others who 
had worked on the building at 4152 South 700 East, including 
Cascade Construction Company. 
2. The sum of $663.59- was payable in part to Zephyr 
Electric. The DeBrys obtained a judgment against Zephyr Electric 
for work not completed on the building at 4252 South 700 East. 
Since the money held by the Trustee was to pay Zephyr, in part for 
its uncompleted work, that money should be applied against the 
Zephyr judgment (copy attached as Ex. A) . 
3. The sum of $3,536.06 was allocated to Cascade 
Construction Company or Cascade Enterprises, partnerships of Mr. 
Thurgood and Mr. Bartel. As the general partner who sold the 
building and built the building, the partners are responsible for 
defalcations by subcontractors and the monies allocated to Cascade 
should be applied to satisfy the judgment of Zephyr. 
4* The sum of $5,400.00 was allocated to Building 
Systems* The documents attached as Ex. B show that DeBrys paid 
Building Systems and assumed the position of Building Systems and 
are entitled to monies payable to Building Systems* 
For the above reasons, the monies allocated to Zephyr 
Electric, Building Systems and Cascade should be paid to the 
DeBrys• 
DATED this P day of June, 1994. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 4 ASSOCIATES 
j 
